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Abstract 
Landlords and tenants have different incentives in making energy efficiency 
investments in housing. Landlords mostly do not pay the energy bills, but do have to 
make the investments. So when energy efficiency improvements are not adequately 
reflected in the rental market, this may lead to landlords underinvesting in energy 
efficiency. This is the so-called split incentive problem, but there is no consensus on 
whether this phenomenon is at play in the real estate market. A large panel dataset 
from the Dutch housing market enables us to investigate whether tenure status affects 
the level of energy efficiency. Using information on nearly three million homes and 
their residents over six years, we track the over-time change in tenure status, from a 
rental to an owner-occupied home. Since energy consumption is closely related to a 
host of dwelling and household characteristics it is crucial to adequately control for 
differences between homeowners and renters. The results of the most robust 
estimations, holding both the dwelling and household constant, show that there is no 
evidence for a split incentive problem in energy efficiency investments in the Dutch 
housing market. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
The built environment is recognized as one of the largest consumers of natural 
resources and polluters of the environment. Within the European Union, buildings are 
responsible for 40 percent of energy consumption and 36 percent of CO2 emissions.1 
Where the residential sector in the European Union consumed more than 25 percent 
of final energy in 2015. For the Netherlands, this is some 20 percent.2 Hence, the real 
estate sector as a whole can play an instrumental role in reaching climate goals such 
as set forth in the Paris Agreement, and this is receiving increasing attention from 
policy makers, regulators, investors and building owners.  
In the residential sector various studies have looked at the relationship between 
the environmental performance and the financial performance of buildings, using 
green building certifications as a proxy for sustainability and energy efficiency. In 
general, these studies document that more energy efficient properties sell and rent for 
more than their less efficient counterparts. For commercial real estate, this has been 
well established by Eichholtz et al. (2010, 2013), Fuerst and McAllister (2011), and 
Chegut et al. (2015). For residential real estate, studies by Brounen and Kok (2011), 
Cerin et al. (2014), Chegut et al. (2016), Feige et al. (2013), Hyland et al. (2013), and 
Kahn and Kok (2013) have resulted in a clear consensus that sustainable assets have 
higher rents, higher transaction prices, and more liquidity in terms of time on the 
market. 
Despite the consensus regarding the presence of a green premium for energy 
efficient homes in the real estate literature, investment inefficiencies in energy 
efficiency remain. The energy efficiency gap, described as the difference between 
 
1 Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efficiency/buildings.  
2 Authors’ calculations based on final energy consumption statistics by sector retrieved from Eurostat: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tsdpc320&langua
ge=en.  
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actual and optimal energy use is often hailed as an explanation for these 
inefficiencies. A lack of information to energy end-users is one of the reasons for the 
existence of the energy efficiency gap. Nonetheless, Alcott and Greenstone (2012) 
conclude that although some consumers are imperfectly informed and investment 
inefficiencies lead to an increase in energy use in multiple settings, the empirical 
magnitude of these inefficiencies is much smaller than often calculated in engineering 
analyses. 
Another strand of work focuses on the split incentives between landlord and 
tenant, also leading to possible underinvestment in energy efficiency. Split incentives 
in residential energy consumption occur in rental housing between owners and 
tenants, and they can go to ways. First, when the tenant is not (directly) responsible 
for the utility bill, this may lead to over-consumption of energy. Second, when the 
tenant is responsible for the utility bill, this may impede building owners from making 
investments in the energy efficiency of their asset since they would not benefit from a 
lower utility bill. Most studies investigate the first split incentive problem and focus 
on the alleged over-consumption of energy, comparing consumption patterns of 
individually metered occupants that directly pay their utility bill to occupants that pay 
for their utilities as part of their rent. 
Levinson and Niemann (2004) examine the split incentive between landlord and 
tenant for rental contracts that include utility costs. Their findings show that despite a 
higher rent for units that include utility costs in the rental contract as compared to 
similar metered units, the rent increment for units that include utilities is smaller than 
the cost of the consumed energy. The authors argue that landlords value such 
contracts more than the costs of the extra energy that is consumed. 
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Similarly, Maruejols and Young (2011) investigate how split incentives influence 
the behavior of tenants in Canadian multi-family housing. By using two groups of 
tenants the authors assess the difference in energy consumption patterns between 
tenants who have a rental contract that includes energy and tenants who pay their own 
utility bill. The results suggest that tenants who do not directly pay for their energy 
consumption increase their thermal comfort and are less sensitive to the dwelling 
being unoccupied. Moreover, these differences are more salient for older buildings. 
The authors conclude that their results support the existence of a split incentive 
problem and suggest that individual metering may have considerable effects on the 
energy consumption behavior of tenants. 
Gillingham et al. (2012) examine the presence of split incentives in rental units in 
California. The authors estimate that households who pay for their own energy are 16 
percent more likely to change the heating setting overnight than households who do 
not directly pay for their energy. However, the authors find little empirical support 
for differences in the temperature level across tenant types. In addition, dwellings 
tend to be better insulated when the owner pays for heating, alluding to a second set 
of split incentives. Owners who do not pay for heating may be less likely to invest in 
improving the insulation quality of an asset. The authors conclude that although split 
incentive problems have an effect on household behavior, they only have a moderate 
impact on energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions. They argue that the 
group of households that do not pay for heating and the behavioral changes are too 
small to have a substantial impact on the environmental performance of buildings.  
As part of the landlord-tenant problem, Davis (2011) examines appliance 
ownership patterns between homeowners and rental tenants using the Residential 
Energy Consumption Survey. The author documents that renters are significantly less 
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likely to own energy efficient appliances. The study focuses on a set of appliances 
that represents about 25 percent of energy consumption in rental housing units. 
Heating and cooling represents the other 75 percent, for which the agency issues may 
actually be worse. 
The second type of the split incentive hypothesis, which would predict that 
landlords would underinvest in the energy efficiency improvements of their real estate 
assets, has received less attention in the literature, but plays a leading role in policy 
discussions. Rehdanz (2007) assesses the determinants of space heating expenditures 
in the German housing market, controlling for a variety of building and household 
characteristics. The author documents that homeowners spend 13 percent less on 
space heating than rental tenants. The author suggests that this finding may allude to 
homeowners being more likely to invest in energy efficiency improvements than 
tenants.  
A similar study for the U.K. by Meier and Rehdanz (2010) uses an annual panel 
over a fifteen-year period to explain differences in heating expenditures. In contrast to 
Rehdanz (2007), the authors conclude that homeownership is associated with a 3 
percent increase in space heating expenditure, controlling for building and household 
characteristics. However, when restricting the sample to similar building types the 
authors do not find evidence for differences in heating expenditures for homeowners 
and rental tenants. As a possible explanation for these finding, the authors suggest that 
rental units tend to be more energy efficient in the U.K. Moreover, homeowners 
predominantly occupy detached or semi-detached homes, suggesting that higher 
levels of heat loss in such homes may explain the initial difference in heating 
expenditure. 
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Wood et al. (2012) perform a cross-sectional analysis for the residential real 
estate market in Australia. By extensively controlling for location, climate, dwelling, 
and household characteristics the authors aim to disentangle the impact of tenure on 
energy expenditure. The authors conclude that the average energy expenditure in 
Australia is some 15 percent higher for homeowners than for rental tenants. The 
different institutional environment in Australia is offered as a possible explanation for 
the divergence of the results from other studies.  
Another of the few studies to analyze the second type of split incentive is 
Charlier (2015). The author documents that homeowners are more likely to invest in 
energy efficiency than rental tenants. The analysis confirms that occupancy status is 
an important determinant of investment in energy efficiency improvements. 
Moreover, the author concludes that tenants face a two-fold disadvantage relative to 
homeowners. First, tenants face higher energy costs due to lower building quality, and 
consequently lower energy efficiency. Second, they face a higher burden of these 
energy costs since rental tenants, on average, have a lower income than homeowners.    
Taken together, the findings indicate that the effect of tenure on energy 
expenditure and the likelihood to invest in energy efficiency improvements differs 
across countries. Moreover, these studies document that building and household 
characteristics differ substantially among owner-occupied and tenant-occupied 
homes. For example, homeowners tend to have a higher income and wealth, often 
occupy larger and detached or semi-detached homes, and have a different household 
composition than rental tenants. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether this presumed underinvestment does occur in 
reality. For example, despite the presence of split incentives, a recent study by Chegut 
et al. (2016) shows that residential building owners are able to recover part of their 
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investment in energy efficiency at the time they sell their assets in the private market. 
This is especially the case when the investment in energy efficiency is part of a 
broader renovation improving the overall quality of the dwelling.  
The best way to investigate whether this split incentive problem really affects the 
energy efficiency of dwellings is to study the energy performance of homes that 
experience a change in tenure status. This is where the contribution of our study lies. 
By examining a large number of homes transacted in the Dutch housing market, we 
are able to observe changes in tenure and their impact on energy consumption. We 
relate changes in the energy consumption pattern for the same dwelling over time to 
the change in tenure, controlling elaborately for household characteristics.  
In addition, for a subset of homes we observe the same household acquiring the 
home, enabling us to hold the dwelling and household constant. By gradually 
increasing the robustness of our estimation procedure we document that when 
correctly controlling for possible endogeneity, there is no evidence for a split 
incentive problem in energy efficiency investments in the Dutch housing market. 
2. Data 
In order to investigate whether investments in the energy performance of homes 
in the Dutch residential real estate market are hindered by split incentives we combine 
two data sources. Our main source of information is the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) in the Netherlands. The CBS provides information on the house, household, 
and actual energy consumption. Information regarding the Energy Performance 
Certificate (EPC) and the underlying Energy Performance Index (as introduced by the 
European Union) is retrieved from AgentschapNL – a governmental body tasked with 
the administration of energy labels in the Netherlands. 
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The descriptive statistics in Table 1 display that rental units are slightly more 
energy efficient than owner occupied dwellings, as indicated by a lower Energy 
Performance Certificate Index. Despite the slightly lower energy efficiency, owner-
occupied homes consume less natural gas per square meter. In contrast, owner-
occupied dwellings consume more electricity than the average rental unit. This may 
be explained by differences in household composition between rental units and 
owner-occupied homes. Households in owner-occupied homes tend to be larger, have 
more children, and are wealthier than households in rental units. Similar to previous 
studies we also observe differences between owner-occupied dwellings and rental 
units in terms of building characteristics. Owner-occupied homes are more often 
detached or semi-detached, whereas most rental units are apartments.  
– Table 1 – 
Figure 1 compares the distribution of the energy performance index, as a proxy 
for energy efficiency, and actual gas consumption per square meter across tenure 
types. Panel A of Figure 1 indicates that the average energy performance index of 
rental homes is somewhat lower than the energy performance index of owner 
occupied homes, indicating a potentially higher energy efficiency. However, 
inspecting the distribution of actual gas consumption per square meter in Panel B of 
Figure 1 shows that owner occupied homes tend to consume slightly less gas per 
square meter. Overall, Figure 1 shows that rental homes are slightly more energy 
efficient than owner occupied homes. 
– Figure 1 – 
The distribution of the sample of homes with an EPC label by construction year 
for the two tenure types, as depicted in Figure 2, shows that pre-WWII homes are 
more prevalent in the owner occupied sample than in the rental sample. Overall, 
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Figure 2 shows that the labeled homes in the rental sample are somewhat newer than 
the labeled homes in the owner occupied sample. 
– Figure 2 – 
Figure 3 depicts the average energy performance index of the labeled homes in 
our sample for each construction year. Not surprisingly, there is a clear relationship 
between the construction period and the energy efficiency of a home. Interestingly, 
the average energy efficiency across construction year for owner-occupied and rental 
homes does not seem to be very different.  
– Figure 3 – 
3. Methodology 
Energy efficiency can be considered as a function of building characteristics and 
household characteristics. In an ideal situation, the identification of a potential split 
incentive effect can be done properly by an experimental design, where the 
occupant’s tenure status changes from tenancy to ownership in the current house, 
keeping all other factors constant. However, since it is not technically possible to run 
this kind of experiment, we use the actual data and try to approximate this ideal 
experimental design. In order to investigate whether the ownership affects the energy 
efficiency investment in the house, we estimate the following empirical model: 
𝐸𝐸"#$ = 𝛽' + 𝛽) ∗ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟"#$ + 𝛽0 ∗ 𝐵"#$ + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐻"#$ + 𝛼" + 𝛿# + 𝜀"#$            (1) 
where 𝐸𝐸"#$  indicates the energy efficiency level of house i accommodated by 
household j in year t. The main variable of interest is the tenure status of the occupant 
(homeowner or renter), denoted by 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟"#$ . The coefficient of this variable 
represents the causal effect of being the owner of the house on the energy efficiency 
investment level.  
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Since ownership status may be correlated with other dwelling characteristics that 
are related to the level of energy efficiency, we also control for other building 
characteristics, which are denoted by 𝐵"#$. For instance, owners may prefer to live in 
newly built homes that have a higher energy efficiency level. This may lead to a 
possible overestimation of the split incentive effect as owners’ motivation to live in 
newly built homes may be related to other factors, not the higher energy efficiency 
level. Besides the construction year, we also control for home type and building size 
in the empirical model. 𝛼" represents the unobserved building characteristics that may 
affect the level of energy efficiency. 
Another concern about the identification of the split incentive effect is that there 
may be other household characteristics that determine the level of energy efficiency, 
which are correlated with the ownership status. For instance, the owners may have a 
higher income and wealth, which might enable them to afford energy efficiency 
investments. In this case, again, there will be an upward bias in the estimated split 
incentive effect. Besides income and wealth, we also control for household size, the 
number of elderly, children and females in the household and the working status of 
household members, which are denoted by 𝐻"#$ . 𝛿#  represents the unobserved 
household characteristics. Finally, 𝜀"#$ is the error term. 
4. Results 
4.1. Cross-sectional Analysis 
We start our analysis with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, relating 
the observable characteristics of a building and household to the energy efficiency of 
a dwelling. Table 2 documents the results of the OLS estimations. When we do not 
control for other house and household characteristics, we observe a lower energy 
efficiency level for the owners. But when we introduce the control variables the sign 
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of the coefficient changes and we find a significant split incentive effect as indicated 
by the coefficient of ownership status. Results indicate that homeownership is 
negatively associated with the energy performance index (controlling for observable 
dwelling and household characteristics, and household wealth). Therefore, as 
compared to renters, homeowners seem to live in homes with higher energy 
efficiency. The size of the coefficient indicates that owning the house as compared to 
renting leads to a 0.8 percent increase in the energy efficiency level. Although this 
effect is statistically significant, we should note that this economic effect is far below 
the expectations and the results documented in the previous literature. 
– Table 2 – 
In order to test the validity of our results, we estimate the same model for the sub-
samples of homes with different construction year periods. If the estimated effect 
reported in Table 2 is truly related to energy efficiency investment decisions, then we 
should be able to report higher split incentive effects for the homes that are built 
earlier as they have more potential for energy efficiency improvements. In line with 
this expectation, the results reported in Table 3 indicate that the split incentive 
problem is more prominent for the older homes that are constructed before 1960s (an 
effect of approximately 4 to 5 percent). We also observe that the owner-occupied 
homes that are constructed after 1960 have slightly lower energy efficiency as 
compared to the rental segment of the housing market. This can be partly explained 
by the social and environmental concerns of the affordable housing institutions in the 
rental market.  
– Table 3 – 
So our initial results show evidence of the split incentive problem in energy 
efficiency investments, but the economic magnitude of the effects is far below 
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expectations. However, there might exist some unobserved house and household 
related factors that are correlated with the ownership status and energy efficiency 
level. In that case, we might have an omitted variable bias in the estimated coefficient 
of ownership status. Therefore, we will next exploit the over-time variation in our 
data, which allows us to introduce house and household-fixed effects, as denoted by 𝛼"	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛿# in equation (1). 
4.2. Fixed-Effects Analysis 
In order to control for unobserved dwelling specific factors that might be 
correlated with ownership status and energy efficiency, we switch to an analysis of 
the link between over-time variation in ownership status and the energy efficiency 
level, keeping the dwellings constant. Since we are not able to observe the over-time 
change in energy performance index of the house (typically households do not adopt a 
new label after efficiency improvements), we use the actual gas consumption per 
square meter as a proxy for the energy efficiency of the dwelling. Table 4 provides 
the results of OLS estimations using the actual gas consumption per square meter as 
dependent variable. Here, we observe that ownership is associated with a higher gas 
and electricity consumption, implying a lower energy efficiency level for 
homeowners. However, this result should be interpreted cautiously as there may exist 
many unobserved factors that can affect the actual energy consumption. Therefore, it 
is important to control for these unobserved factors in the analysis.   
– Table 4 – 
First, we focus on the mobility of the households to control for unobserved house 
specific factors. As a treatment group, we use a sample of homes that were occupied 
by tenants and then switched to owner-occupied status. The control group consists of 
homes that remained rental unit during the period of analysis. The results reported in 
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Table 5 indicate that controlling for all observable household characteristics and 
keeping the houses fixed, the change of ownership status from rental to owner leads to 
a 4.6 percent decrease in gas consumption in the subsequent years. Assuming that 
there is no behavioral change in energy consumption after moving to a new house, 
this can be considered as an almost equal increase in energy efficiency level 
(assuming zero rebound effect).  
– Table 5 – 
In order to test whether this change is associated to the behavior of new residents, 
we estimate the same model for electricity consumption. Since the electricity 
consumption in the Netherlands is mainly driven by the appliance stock of the 
households, we can assume that electricity consumption is mostly independent of the 
energy efficiency of the dwelling (except lighting), but mostly related to household-
specific factors. So, if the change in energy consumption is driven by energy 
efficiency investments rather than behavioral factors, we do not expect a significant 
change in the electricity consumption level. In line with this expectation, the second 
column of Table 5 indicates that, controlling for other household characteristics, the 
change in ownership status does not effect the electricity consumption. Thus, we can 
conclude that the change in actual gas consumption is due to changes in the energy 
efficiency of the dwelling.  
Another way to test whether the estimated coefficient reflects a difference in 
consumption behavior is to examine the homes that changed from owner-occupied to 
rental status (reverse direction). In Table 6, we redefine the treatment group as the 
homes that switched from owner-occupied to rental status, and the control group as 
the homes that stayed owner-occupied. Here, our hypothesis is that the estimated 
coefficient of ownership is not statistically different from zero, as it is not possible to 
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decrease energy efficiency of a home when it changes from owner-occupied to rental 
status. The results indicate that, although the estimated coefficient is significant, it is 
significantly lower than the result provided in column 1 of Table 5. This implies that 
there might be a behavioral change in gas consumption (or because of mobility), but 
still there is a significant change in consumption level that can be associated to the 
changes in energy efficiency level. 
– Table 6 – 
However, one may argue that the change in energy efficiency is not mainly 
driven by the ownership status but instead driven by the mobility effect. We can 
expect that when households move to a new house, they usually prefer to make 
improvements in their new homes. Or, the landlords might prefer to make 
improvements before they rent out their dwellings. These changes in energy 
efficiency cannot be considered a split incentive effect. So, the estimated coefficient 
of change in ownership status reported in Table 5 might reflect the improvements 
related to the mobility of the households instead of a split incentive effect. In order to 
test this hypothesis, we estimate our model for two different sample specifications. 
First, we use the sample of rental homes that switched to a new tenant as the 
treatment group and the homes that stayed with the same tenant as the control group. 
The results provided in column 1 indicate that this change results in a 5.4 percent 
reduction in actual gas consumption. In column 2, we define the treatment group as 
the owner-occupied homes that switched to a new owner and the control group as the 
homes that stayed with the same owner. Again the results indicate a 5.7 percent 
reduction in actual gas consumption, which can be attributed to the energy efficiency 
investments of new residents. This mobility effect seems to be an important 
determinant of energy efficiency investments. Therefore, the estimated coefficient for 
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ownership status in Table 5 might reflect the mobility effect instead of the split 
incentive problem. 
– Table 7 – 
In order to eliminate the behavioral bias and the mobility effect from the 
estimations, we next control for household fixed effects. We define the treatment 
groups as the homes that switched from rental to owner-occupied status during the 
stay of the same resident (fixed households). This means that the tenants in the 
treatment group buy the homes they have been living in. The control group consists of 
the homes that stayed rental, keeping the households fixed. This sample design 
eliminates any behavioral differences between the owner and tenants, as we keep the 
households fixed. Besides, it eliminates the mobility effect, as the households do not 
change their addresses. The results reported in column 1 of Table 8 indicate that there 
is no significant split incentive effect when we control for all house and household 
specific factors. This result is still valid when we limit the sample to older homes as 
provided in column 2 of Table 8. 
– Table 8 – 
The result provided in Table 8 can be considered as our most robust estimation of 
the split incentive effect as it controls for all dwelling and household specific 
unobserved factors. Contradicting the previous literature on the topic, which is not 
able to control for these endogenous factors, we document that there is no evidence 
for a split incentive problem in energy efficiency investments in the housing market. 
On the other hand, another part of the literature provides significant evidence showing 
that energy efficiency investments are capitalized in the rental housing market. This 
can explain why landlords are equally motivated with homeowners to invest in energy 
efficiency. 
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5. Conclusion 
Different split incentive problems are observed in the housing market. First, a 
split incentive problem may arise when the utility expenditures are included in the 
rental contract, potentially leading to over-consumption of energy. Second, the tenant-
landlord problem may lead to underinvestment in energy efficiency improvements in 
the building sector, since the landlord has to invest in energy efficiency improvements 
and the tenant benefits in the form of a lower utility bill. 
The lack of consensus in the academic literature regarding the second split 
incentive issue indicates the difficulty in isolating the effect. Rehdanz (2007) shows 
for the German housing market that homeowners spend approximately 15 percent less 
on energy, suggesting that homeowners are more likely to invest in energy efficiency 
improvements. In contrast, Meier and Rehdanz (2010) find no split incentive problem 
in the residential real estate market in the U.K. The authors conclude that this can be 
explained by differences in building type between homeowners and renters. 
Homeowners tend to occupy a larger share of detached and semi-detached homes, in 
which the heat loss is higher. Wood et al. (2012) find for Australia that homeowners 
spend 13 more on energy than renters. The authors conclude that differences in the 
institutional framework in Australia compared to Europe and North America may 
explain these results. In addition, Charlier (2015) documents that homeowners are 
more likely to invest in energy efficiency improvements than renters. Moreover, the 
author concludes that renters face higher energy costs due to lower building quality 
and, on average, have a lower income. 
One conclusion that these studies have in common is the substantial differences 
between homeowners and renters. Homeowners tend to be richer, have larger homes, 
more often occupy a detached or semi-detached dwelling, and have a different 
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household composition. All these factors are known to affect energy consumption. 
Consequently, previous studies in this area have been hampered by endogeneity 
issues. The panel data employed in this paper allows us to control for all dwelling and 
household specific unobserved factors. By gradually developing the analysis from a 
standard OLS framework to a more robust estimation in which the dwelling and 
household is held constant, we show that there is no evidence for a split incentive 
problem in energy efficiency investments in the housing market. A potential 
explanation for the absence of the split incentive problem in the Dutch housing 
market is the capitalization of energy efficiency in the rent and transaction value of 
dwellings.  
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Figure 1 
Distribution of Energy Efficiency by Tenure Status 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of Construction Year by Tenure Type 
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Figure 3 
Energy Efficiency and Construction Year by Tenure Status 
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Owner-Occupied Tenant-Occupied
Annual Gas Consumption (thousand cubic meters) 1.50 1.26
(0.667) (0.534)
Annual Electricity Consumption (thousand kwh) 3.18 2.52
(1.595) (1.370)
Annual Gas Consumption per square meter (cubic meter) 14.97 15.36
(6.127) (6.600)
EPC Index 1.81 1.77
(0.535) (0.501)
Dwelling Size (square meter) 102.69 82.64
(31.05) (20.55)
Construction Period (percent)
1900-1930 8.00 5.50
1931-1944 5.10 1.90
1945-1959 12.30 16.40
1960-1969 18.10 19.40
1970-1979 23.90 20.30
1980-1989 18.10 21.70
1990-1999 11.70 11.70
After 2000 2.80 3.20
Dwelling Type (percent)
Apartment 27.00 43.80
Duplex 31.50 33.90
Semi-Detached 30.60 0.20
Detached 10.90 22.00
Number of Household Members 2.29 1.90
(1.182) (1.101)
Number of Children 0.51 0.34
(0.885) (0.779)
Number of Elderly 0.22 0.48
(0.552) (0.695)
Number of Females 1.13 1.03
(0.777) (0.725)
Annual Household Net Income (in thousand euros) 32.14 23.19
(11.61) (9.81)
Household Wealth (in thousand euros) 113.73 21.46
(137.80) (50.29)
Number of Wage Earners 1.46 0.80
(0.885) (0.903)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. All variables in percent unless indicated otherwise.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Owner-occupied (1=yes) 0.002*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dwelling Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Household Wealth No No No Yes
Number of Observations 3,120,746 3,120,746 3,120,746 3,120,746
Number of Homes 1,188,289 1,188,289 1,188,289 1,188,289
R-squared 0.031 0.412 0.413 0.413
Table 2
OLS Estimations for Energy Performance Index
Notes: We limit the sample to the observations for which we have information on household wealth. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the energy performance index. A lower energy performance index indicates a higher 
level of energy efficiency. The years included in the analysis are 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010 (for tenure status and 
household characteristics). The analysis is based on the sample of homes that adopted an energy label between 2008 
and 2013. Year of observation, label adoption year and province fixed effects are included as control variables in all 
estimations. Dwelling characteristics are: construction period, dwelling type, and dwelling size. Household 
characteristics are: household net income, number of household members, number of children (age lower than 18 
years), number of elderly (age larger or equal to 65 years), number of females, and working status of household 
members. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 
province-year level. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level is indicated by *,**, and *** respectively.
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Construction Period (1900-1929) (1930-1944) (1945-1959) (1960-1969)
Owner-occupied (1=yes) -0.037*** -0.056*** -0.050*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Dwelling Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Wealth Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 165,088 60,241 490,536 593,042
R-squared 0.147 0.156 0.065 0.116
Construction Period (1970-1979) (1980-1989) (1990-1999) (After 2000)
Owner-occupied (1=yes) 0.012*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Dwelling Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Wealth Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 646,881 669,142 390,087 105,729
R-squared 0.097 0.084 0.099 0.091
Table 3
OLS Estimations for Energy Performance Index by Construction Period
Notes: We limit the sample to the observations for which we have information on household wealth. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the energy performance index. A lower energy performance index indicates a higher 
level of energy efficiency. The years included in the analysis are 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010 (for tenure status and 
household characteristics). The analysis is based on the sample of homes that adopted an energy label between 2008 
and 2013. Year of observation, label adoption year and province fixed effects are included as control variables in all 
estimations. Dwelling characteristics are: construction period, dwelling type, and dwelling size. Household 
characteristics are: household net income, number of household members, number of children (age lower than 18 
years), number of elderly (age larger or equal to 65 years), number of females, and working status of household 
members. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 
province-year level. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level is indicated by *,**, and *** respectively.
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(1) (2)
Gas Electricity
Owner-occupied (1=yes) 0.071*** 0.077***
(0.001) (0.001)
Dwelling Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Wealth Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,072,130 3,072,130
Number of Homes 1,188,289 1,188,289
R-squared 0.252 0.370
Table 4
OLS Estimations for Gas and Electricity Consumption
Notes: We limit the sample to the observations for which we have information on household wealth. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the annual gas consumption per square meter (column 1) and the logarithm of electricity 
consumption (column 2). The years included in the analysis are 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010 (for energy 
consumption, tenure status and household characteristics). The analysis is based on the sample of homes that 
adopted an energy label between 2008 and 2013. Year of observation, label adoption year and province fixed effects 
are included as control variables in all estimations. Dwelling characteristics are: construction period, dwelling type, 
and dwelling size. Household characteristics are: household net income, number of household members, number of 
children (age lower than 18 years), number of elderly (age larger or equal to 65 years), number of females, and 
working status of household members. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the province-year level. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level is indicated by 
*,**, and *** respectively.
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(1) (2)
Gas Electricity
Owner-occupied (1=yes) -0.046*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Dwelling Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Wealth Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,307,037 3,307,037
Number of Homes 1,188,289 1,188,289
R-squared 0.137 0.060
Table 5
Fixed Effects Estimations for Gas and Electricity Consumption
Notes: We limit the sample to the observations for which we have information on household wealth. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the annual gas consumption per square meter (column 1) and the logarithm of electricity 
consumption (column 2). The analysis is based on the sample of homes with and without an energy label. The 
variable "Owner-occupied" indicates the switch from tenant-occupied to owner-occupied status. We exclude the 
homes that stayed owner-occupied during the period of analysis and the homes that changed from owner-occupied 
to tenant-occupied status. This enables us to compare the homes that switched from tenant-occupied to owner-
occupied with the homes that stayed tenant-occupied. The number of transitions from tenant-occupied to owner-
occupied is 92,303 (6.6 percent of the sample). The years included in the analysis are 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010 
(for energy consumption, tenure status and household characteristics). Year of observation is included as a control 
variable in all estimations. Household characteristics are: household net income, number of household members, 
number of children (age lower than 18 years), number of elderly (age larger or equal to 65 years), number of 
females, and working status of household members. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the province-year level. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level is 
indicated by *,**, and *** respectively.
Rental Tenant to Owner
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(1) (2)
Gas Electricity
Owner-occupied (1=yes) -0.012*** -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Dwelling Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Wealth Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,698,867 1,698,867
Number of Homes 689,605 689,605
R-squared 0.130 0.110
Table 6
Fixed Effects Estimations for Gas and Electricity Consumption
Owner to Rental Tenant
Notes: We limit the sample to the observations for which we have information on household wealth. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the annual gas consumption per square meter (column 1) and the logarithm of electricity 
consumption (column 2). The analysis is based on the sample of homes with and without an energy label. The 
variable "Owner-occupied" indicates the switch from owner-occupied to tenant-occupied status. We exclude the 
homes that stayed tenant-occupied during the period of analysis and the homes that changed from tenant-occupied 
to owner-occupied status. This enables us to compare the homes that switched from owner-occupied to tenant-
occupied with the homes that stayed owner-occupied. The number of transitions from owner-occupied to tenant-
occupied is 29,744 (3.5 percent of the sample). The years included in the analysis are 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010 
(for energy consumption, tenure status and household characteristics). Year of observation is included as a control 
variable in all estimations. Household characteristics are: household net income, number of household members, 
number of children (age lower than 18 years), number of elderly (age larger or equal to 65 years), number of 
females, and working status of household members. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the province-year level. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level is 
indicated by *,**, and *** respectively.
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(1) (2)
Gas Gas
New Tenant (1=yes) -0.054***
(0.001)
New Owner (1=yes) -0.057***
(0.001)
Dwelling Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Wealth Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,938,018 1,458,292
Number of Homes 1,012,805 569,343
R-squared 0.150 0.146
Table 7
Fixed Effects Estimations for Gas Consumption
New Tenant or Owner
Notes: We limit the sample to the observations for which we have information on household wealth. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the annual gas consumption per square meter. The analysis is based on the sample of 
homes with and without an energy label. The variable "New Tenant" indicates the switch from one tenant to a new 
tenant. We exclude the owner-occupied homes from the analysis. This enables us to compare the homes that 
switched to a new tenant with the homes that stayed with the same tenant. The number of transitions to a new tenant 
is 420,343 (35.5 percent of the sample). The variable "New Owner indicates the switch from one owner to a new 
owner. We exclude the tenant-occupied homes from the analysis. This enables us to compare the homes that 
switched to a new owner with the homes that stayed with the same owner The number of transitions to a new owner 
is 334,298 (48.5 percent of the sample). The years included in the analysis are 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010 (for 
energy consumption, tenure status and household characteristics). Year of observation is included as a control 
variable in all estimations. Household characteristics are: household net income, number of household members, 
number of children (age lower than 18 years), number of elderly (age larger or equal to 65 years), number of 
females, and working status of household members. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the province-year level. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level is 
indicated by *,**, and *** respectively.
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(1) (2)
Gas Gas
Construction Period (1900-2010) (1900-1959)
Owner-occupied (1=yes) -0.002 0.005
(0.002) (0.004)
Dwelling Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Wealth Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,698,867 1,698,867
Number of Homes 689,605 689,605
R-squared 0.130 0.110
Table 8
Fixed Effects Estimations for Gas Consumption
Tenant to Owner, and Household Fixed
Notes: We limit the sample to the observations for which we have information on household wealth. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the annual gas consumption per square meter. The analysis is based on the sample of 
homes with and without an energy label. The variable "Owner-occupied" indicates the switch from tenant-occupied 
to owner-occupied status for the same household at the same home. We exclude the owner-occupied homes and the 
homes that switched from owner-occupied to tenant-occupied status from the analysis. This enables us to compare 
the homes that switched from tenant-occupied to owner-occupied with the homes that stayed tenant-occupied, 
keeping the household constant. The number of transitions from tenant-occupied to owner-occupiedin the same 
house is 15,179 (2 percent of the sample). Column 2 is based on the sample of homes that were constructed between 
1900 and 1959. The number of transistions from tenant-occupied to owner-occupied in the same house (older 
homes) is 4,583 (2.5 percent of the sample). The years included in the analysis are 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010 (for 
energy consumption, tenure status and household characteristics). Year of observation is included as a control 
variable in all estimations. Household characteristics are: household net income, number of household members, 
number of children (age lower than 18 years), number of elderly (age larger or equal to 65 years), number of 
females, and working status of household members. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the province-year level. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level is 
indicated by *,**, and *** respectively.
